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Lord and Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

This is a minor problem, however. It
does not significantly mar an excellent
work that will serve anyone desiring
grounding in strategic studies or a refresher on strategy.
MARK T. CLARK

California State University
San Bernardino, California

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. 448pp.
$27.95

This monumental and ambitious work
sets out to provide the definitive account
of the “offensive realism” school of international relations theory. Offensive
realism represents a kind of synthesis of
the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau and the structural or “defensive”
realism of Kenneth Waltz. With Morgenthau it assumes that states (or major
states) seek to accumulate as much
power as possible for themselves, but it
accepts Waltz’s view that the reason they
do so lies in the structure of the international system rather than in the human
lust for power. Mearsheimer must therefore show that Waltz and his many followers have been overly optimistic in
analyzing the implications for state behavior of the anarchic character of the
international system. According to
Mearsheimer, they have wrongly assumed that a cautious or defensive approach to safeguarding a state’s security
is the only rational approach and hence
the norm for most states. Rather, he insists, aggressive or expansionist behavior
is both more common in the recent history of the great powers than this would
allow and more rational in the sense that
it is not infrequently very successful.
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Mearsheimer’s thesis is richly illustrated,
from the history of the great powers
from the wars of the French Revolution
through the end of the Cold War. It also
looks out into the future to test the theory against the common if vaguely articulated belief that great-power war has
become obsolete. For these reasons, and
because it is written in a clear and jargonfree style, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics holds much interest even for
those with limited patience for the theological disputes of international relations
theorists. At the same time, it is a formidable challenge to mainstream realism.
It scores many points off an approach
that somehow never comes to grips with
what one is tempted to call the sheer
bloody-mindedness of international politics. Particularly novel and persuasive is
Mearsheimer’s analysis of “buck passing” (not “bandwagoning”) as the fundamental alternative to balancing against
another power.
Yet the book has its limitations, which
are largely the limitations of the realist
school as such. Mearsheimer never quite
convinces when he argues that the domestic regimes and leadership of, for example, Britain, the United States, Nazi
Germany, and imperial Japan had no
fundamental impact on their international behavior. But perhaps the weakest
part of the book is its disregard of the
ideological context of nineteenth-century European diplomacy. The antirevolutionary alliance of Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, and the “Concert of Europe,”
were arguably at least as important in
maintaining the long great-power peace
through much of this period as were the
abstract structural characteristics of the
European state system. For that matter,
the fact that many of the wars that did
occur were connected in some way with
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the decay of the Ottoman Empire seems
to suggest, contra Mearsheimer, that
wars can be caused as much by the
weakness as by the strength of a key actor. Both these points have suggestive
applications as we look to the twentyfirst century. The war against terrorism
might well be the occasion for the formation of a global “concert” of the great
powers. The greatest threat to such a
concert could well be the continuing
weakness of Russia—not, as Mearsheimer holds, the rising strength of
China.
CARNES LORD

Naval War College

Kagan, Donald, and Fredrick W. Kagan. While
America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness,
and the Threat to Peace Today. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. 483pp. $32.50

Did the leadership of the United States
throw away a priceless opportunity to
bring stability, prosperity, and peace to
the world in the decade following the
end of the Cold War, as surely as the
leadership of Great Britain failed to
grasp a similar opportunity following the
end of the First World War? For Donald
and Fredrick Kagan, the answer is a resounding yes. While America Sleeps is
their attempt not only to show how opportunities were squandered but also to
highlight the similarities of both situations. The Kagans argue that both
states dangerously reduced the size of
their military forces, falsely believed in
the saving power of technology,
failed to exercise strategic leadership, and embarked on a pattern of
“pseudo-engagement.” The importance of the central question and the
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authors’ credentials make this a book to
be taken seriously.
The Kagans, both historians of note,
make a potent father-and-son team.
Donald Kagan, the Hillhouse Professor
of History and Classics at Yale University, has produced an impressive body of
work, including the best-selling A History of Warfare. Fredrick W. Kagan, currently a professor of military history at
West Point, is perhaps less well known
to the general public but has impressive
credentials in his own right.
While America Sleeps is divided into
three sections. The first, “Britain between the Wars,” chronicles that state’s
transition from a globally dominant
power in 1918 to one of near-fatal
weakness by the mid-1930s. It pays special attention to the Chanak crisis of
1922, the Corfu affair of 1923, the
Locarno Treaty of 1925, the ItalianEthiopian War of 1934–35, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936.
The second, “The United States after
the Cold War,” follows a generally similar approach, addressing particularly
the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the
U.S. intervention in Somalia from 1991
to 1993, the occupation of Haiti in
1994, the Clinton administration’s attempts to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, that same
administration’s efforts to curtail Iraqi
production of weapons of mass destruction, and American responses to
conflict in the Balkans. The true third
section, although actually included in
the second section of the book, is the
concluding chapter, in which the authors clearly state their belief that the
United States is at risk of “suffering a
fate similar to that which befell Britain
in the 1930s.” They present an argument supporting this conclusion and
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